
# A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES

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#### PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of opensource material on three current Indochina-related issues:

- \* Thailand's political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
- \* tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
- \* the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title.

Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

#### GLOSSARY

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste ANS (Sihanoukist National Army) Association of Southeast Asian ASEAN Nations Coalition Government of Democratic **CGDK** Kampuchea DK Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) National United Front for an FUNCINPEC Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Khmer Communist Party KCP Khmer People's National Liberation KPNLF Front (Son Sann) Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed KPRAF Forces Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot) KR Khmer United Front for National KUFNCD Construction and Defense (PRK) Progressive [lit: moving in new Naeo Na directions People's Army of Vietnam PAVN Provisional Central Committee for **PCCS** Salvation (KPNLF) Permanent Military Committee for PERMICO Coordination (KPNLF and ANS) People's Republic of Kampuchea PRK People's Revolutionary Party of PRPK Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer People's Revolutionary Party)

RTG

Royal Thai Government

Siam Rat

Thai Nation

SPK

News Agency of the PRK

· SRV

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Su Anakhot

Forward [lit: going toward the
future]

1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING
THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

### A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES January, 1986

"Academic Assails Thai, ASEAN Policy." <u>Matichon</u>, 26 August 1985, p.4. In JPRS-SEA-85-180, 26 November 1985, pp. 71-75.

Pratheep Nakornchai, a member of the political science faculty of Thammasat University, tells a specially organized seminar that Thailand's current foreign policy with respect to Cambodia does not conform to reality. Five elements of the existing situation are noted as being unfavorable to Thai policy: the international situation where the superpowers do not have Thailand's best interests in mind; the situation in the Indochinese countries where military and financial aid continues to be forthcoming from the USSR; the disorder of the Khmer resistance; the weakness of ASEAN where many member countries are far removed from the problem; and finally, Thailand's internal situation where preparations for defending Thailand's borders do not appear to be too serious and where combat troops are not sufficiently organized to adequately resist Vietnam's intrusions. The crux of the problem, however, is the Khmer Rouge; Thailand is not so much supporting this element of the resistance as protecting it. Praetheep argues that the Khmer Rouge have no more right to a second chance than did Hitler and Tojo. By preserving the Khmer Rouge, Thailand is opting to sustain the problem.

2.	TACTICS	AND	ORGANIZATION	OF	KHMER	LAOTIAN	RESISTANCE	GROUPS

### A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES January 1985

Branigan, William. "Cambodian Opposition Split; Group Says Son Sann is Out." Washington Post, 3 January 1986, pp. A21, A26.

A dissident faction of the KPNLF announces that it is the "sole master" of the organization in a virtual military coup against its leader, Son Sann. In response, Son Sann denounces the "open rebellion" of the dissident group, called the Provisional Central Committee of Salvation. The rift became public in December when the group was formed under the leadership of the front's military chief, General. Sak Sutsakhan, who accused Son Sann of exercising "dictatorial powers." One of the prime movers behind the committee, Abdul Gaffar Peangmeth, states that it will now turn its full attention to the struggle inside Cambodia and ignore Son Sann. The rebels are reported to have the support of the military hierarchy, but a majority of local commanders, rank-and-file guerrillas, and civilian followers continue to back Son Sann. The Thai Government has avoided public comment on the dispute, but Son Sann supporters say they suspect Thailand is promoting the rebels and that the Thai military has not allowed Son Sann to visit the border, thus effectively blocking any plans for rallying his supporters.

Deron, Francis. "AFP Examines Tension in Cambodian Leadership Factions." Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), 17 October 1985. In JPRS-SEA-85-175, 13 November 1985, p. 75.

Analysts report that there are leadership strains in both rival Cambodian governments with the worst affected group being the KPNLF led by Son Sann. Serious disputes between KPNLF leaders have surfaced, and Son Sann threatened to resign in August if the movement did not sort out its problems. The Khmer Rouge have also had their leadership problems. Pol Pot's removal is believed to have been engineered by the Chinese in the face of considerable Khmer Rouge leadership resistance. Rumors of disagreements among Khmer Rouge commanders are becoming more widespread. Only Prince Sihanouk's small guerrilla band seems united behind its leader.

# A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES January, 1986

"Pol Pot". <u>Naeow Na (Bangkok)</u>, 9 September 1985, p. 4. In JPRS-SEA-85-173, 8 November 1985, pp. 87-88.

Editorial alleges that while the withdrawal of Pol Pot from the position of supreme military commander should be welcomed, his ousting is "proof of the continued tricks of Vietnam." The call by Vietnam to remove Pol Pot "hides its aim of destroying Cambodia's opposition" by depriving the Cambodian resistance of a "highly competent military man."

Tasker, Rodney. "Variations on a Theme." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong)</u>, 12 December 1985, pp. 26, 27. HC 411 .F18

In an article mainly concerned with Vietnamese tactics for the current dry season campaign, the author mentions that the Khmer Rouge have been organizing deep-penetration squads of up to 18 men, who travel down through Preah Vihear Province as far to the east of Cambodia as Mondulkari Province, carrying out sabotage operations and hit-and-run attacks on Vietnamese military and communications centers. The main target for guerrilla operations remains the Tonle Sap area with a sizable population involved in farming and fishing. The KPNLF's main military base is now thought to be on the western fringe of the Dongrek mountain range, but internal squabbles and a reluctance to leave the border area has limited the number of troops fighting in the interior to an estimated 1,000 of a 14,000 total strength. The ANS, on the other hand, with total forces numbering 10,000, are believed to have 2,000-3,000 troops operating inside Cambodia and are given more credit by analysts for sincerely trying to wage an effective guerrilla operation than the numerically stronger KPNLF.